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FORCED INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND THE FALLACY OF
TRANSPARENCY IN MARKETS
TIMOTHY N. CASON and CHARLES R. PLOTT*
A theory advanced in regulatory hearings holds that market performance will be
improved if one side of themarket is forced to publicly reveal preferences. For example,
wholesale electricity producers claim that retail electricity consumers would pay lower
prices if wholesale public utility demand is disclosed to producers. Experimental
markets studied here featured decentralized, privately negotiated contracts, typical
of the wholesale electricity markets. Two conclusions emerge: (1) such markets
generally converge to the competitive equilibrium and (2) forced disclosure works
to the disadvantage of the disclosing side. Information disclosure would result in higher
wholesale and thus higher retail electricity prices. (JEL L50, L94, D43)
Ratepayers (i.e. California consumers) are aided
when market participants have access to this level
of [comprehensive utility planning data] informa-
tion. . . . market participants (e.g. generators,
energy service providers . . . ) are able to more
effectively plan to meet the demands of rate-
payers . . . [to] develop the most efficient and
cost-effective solution to meeting product demand.
—Independent Energy Producers
Association (2004, p. 4)
The C[alifornia] E[nergy] C[omission] does not be-
lieve that California ratepayers will be harmed by
a more transparent system. . . . [it] believes all plan-
ning ‘‘facts’’ ought to be publicly available.
—California Energy Commission’s Comments
on Confidentiality of Planning and
Procurement Information (2004, p. 4, p. 7)
I. INTRODUCTION
The epigraphs, taken at face value, suggest
that some commentators and policy makers
believe that more information about the objec-
tives of one side of a market made available to
the other side of the market always improves
the advantages of the market for all. One often
sees the term transparency to describe a whole-
some objective for regulated markets, refer-
ring to the disclosure of private information
by market participants. The belief is about
the fundamental principles of price discovery
in markets—that the law of supply and de-
mand operate neutrally and more efficiently
if all information is public. The belief is
reflected, for example, in the ‘‘sunshine’’ pro-
visions of regulatory rule making in many
states, as well as advice for financial markets
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF
2001). The question posed by this article is
whether the basic principle is correct or
whether it is actually misleading about the
consequences of disclosure policies.
Is more information always better? Moti-
vated by a dispute over information disclosure
proposed for California’s regulated utilities,
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this article presents laboratory evidence that
forcing only some parties to reveal private in-
formation when bargaining with others can re-
sult in inferior terms of trade for the revealing
agents. In other words, the policy advocated
by the California Energy Commission and
similar policy bodies are based on unreliable
(indeed incorrect) principles. Forcing the util-
ities to reveal confidential information regard-
ing their energy demands to suppliers leads to
higher negotiated prices and ultimately higher
electricity prices for California consumers.
The fallacy is that greater information in mar-
kets necessarily improves market performance
from the point of view of all participants.
Although no detailed theory that leads to this
view is offered, the fallacy itself appears to
rest on a flawed interpretation of the law
of supply and demand along the following
lines: Efficient market equilibration is identified
with the Nash equilibrium of an associated game
theory model. For the game to equilibrate at an
efficient Nash equilibrium, compete information
about player utility functions must be necessary.
Therefore, markets will work better if the utility
functions are known to all. Of course, every
sentence of the argument can be challenged
as incorrect.
Our experiment evaluates the market im-
plications of greater information dissemina-
tion based on a static environment without
endogenous entry or exit of suppliers. The
quotes for California, as well as the position
of the European Federation of Energy Traders
(EFET), indicate that commentators believe
that one benefit of greater transparency arises
through more efficient entry decisions.1 Al-
though the experiment does not address these
long-run considerations directly, it does pro-
vide some indirect evidence that entry could be
attracted by greater information dissemina-
tion because the information leads to higher
prices and profits of suppliers. But if this infor-
mation release ultimately leads to lower costs
to the buying utilities due to increased entry,
utilities should not need additional regula-
tions to force them to reveal their planning
and procurement data.
Before presenting details of the experimen-
tal design, we find it useful to first present
some background of the motivating contro-
versy in the California electricity market that
serves to characterize the manner in which the
fallacy finds its way into important regulatory
discussions. Overall, about one-third of the
energy requirements of California’s investor-
owned electric utilities are met by utility-
owned generation. The remaining two-thirds
is bought from independent power producers,
other out-of-state utilities, and federal power
projects, such as the Bonneville Power Ad-
ministration. Although some of this power is
bought on centralized spot markets, much is
procured through short-term (a year or less)
and medium-term (one to five years) contracts
that are negotiated with these suppliers.
The relationship between California’s elec-
tric utilities and third-party intervenors such as
The Utility ReformNetwork (TURN) and the
Office of Ratepayer Advocates (ORA) has
been strained over the years, particularly re-
cently because of the well-publicized problems
with energy pricing in the state. Starting in
2002, these intervenors, supported by market
participants who sell power to California
utilities, sought to require the utilities to pub-
licly release substantial amounts of short- and
long-term planning data to all market partic-
ipants, including all product, price, forecast,
and availability information contained in the
utilities’ procurement-related activities and
applications. The intervenors and suppliers
argued that this increased the market’s trans-
parency and would operate to the benefit of
the electricity-consuming public. In the utili-
ties’ opinion, however, revealing such detailed
data is tantamount to revealing all of their
relevant demand information to potential
suppliers prior to initiating negotiations.
Through a series of hearings, administrative
law judge rulings, and negotiated settlements
between the utilities and the intervenors during
2002 and 2003, the utilities either agreed to or
were ordered to provide some additional infor-
mation that had previously been considered
confidential. Some planning and forecast data,
as well as short-term procurement plans, for
example, are now released but with a lag of
several years. Other ‘‘market-sensitive’’ infor-
mation was not to be released. Nevertheless,
in a 3April 2003 ruling, the judges and the Pub-
lic Utilities Commission expressed intent to re-
visit their approach governing the treatment
of confidential information, to improve ‘‘trans-
parency in resource planning.’’ The utilities
1. ‘‘Poor access to information raises a huge barrier to
the entry of new market participants and is stifling the de-
velopment of efficient, transparent wholesale markets’’
(EFET, 2003, p. 1).
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strongly oppose releasing more information
to the suppliers, and the suppliers strongly
support receiving additional information from
the utilities.2
It is well recognized in economics, of
course, that as long as interests of bargainers
are not sufficiently integrative (i.e., are not
largely aligned with common interests) then
providing private information to a bargaining
opponent can make the revealing party no
better off. This is true of most economics
problems, such as bargaining over predomi-
nantly distributive attributes like price. For
example, see Kennan and Wilson (1993) for
an overview of bargaining models with private
information. In regulatory disputes like this,
however, theoretical arguments may not carry
as much weight as clear, empirical evidence.
To make a clear comparison between market
outcomes with and without information dis-
closure using field data would require at
least two different regulatory territories with
different disclosure rules but similar market
conditions (e.g., number of utilities, suppliers,
power exchanges, procurement rules, weather
conditions, etc.). Therefore, an accurate em-
pirical evaluation of the information disclo-
sure rules, holding other market conditions
constant, is not feasible with field data. Empir-
ical evidence, however, can be provided by
a laboratory study.
Our laboratory experiment consists of 17
separatemarket sessions.We consider five sep-
arate environments, as explained in section III.
All experiments are conducted in a new labora-
tory trading mechanism, described in section
II,meant tocapturemanyof the salient features
of a market with multilateral, private pairwise
negotiations, with no public transaction price
information. This provides a reasonable ap-
proximation to the process of negotiating con-
tracts for energy in California, where only the
very short-term (day ahead and hour ahead)
needs are priced in centralized markets.
Section IV presents the results. We find that
negotiated prices tend to favor the informa-
tion advantaged side of the market; for ex-
ample, prices were higher when information
about buyers’ demand was revealed to sellers
than when information about sellers’ cost was
revealed to buyers. This advantage occurs
both in the adjustment phase as prices are
moving toward equilibrium, as well as after
equilibrium is reached. We also find that when
sellers have some information about demand
conditions and their own costs, prices are
more sensitive to changes in demand condi-
tions than changes in supply (cost) conditions.
Prices do reach competitive equilibrium and
nearly all gains from trade are extracted, re-
gardless of the information disclosure rule,
so our results do not identify a short-run
efficiency cost of the information disclosure.
Rather, the impact of information disclosure
affects the distribution of surplus. If public
utility regulators are concerned about bene-
fiting rate payers, our results indicate that this
goal is not achieved by revealing demand in-
formation to sellers.
To our knowledge, this is the first ex-
perimental study that examines this type of
information asymmetry in multilateral nego-
tiations. Several previous studies, however,
have introduced information asymmetries to
bilateral negotiations. Murnighan et al. (1999)
formed bargaining pairs and then privately
provided information about both bargainers’
payoff schedules to one member of the pair.
The pairs negotiated over multiple dimen-
sions, including some with distributive charac-
teristics (like price) as well as others with
integrative, cooperative characteristics. In
face-to-face bargaining, the information pro-
vided to one member of the pair allowed that
member to negotiate more favorable out-
comes compared to a control treatment with
symmetrically, partially informed bargainers.
But asymmetrically informed bargainers were
not able to negotiate more favorable settle-
ments when negotiations were conducted
through computer chat windows. Roth and
Murnighan (1982) also compare symmetric
and asymmetric information bargains struck
over computerized chats, but over lottery
chips for prizes of known and unknown value.
They find that the asymmetrically informed
member of the bargaining pair is able to earn
more than his counterpart.
Srivastava et al. (2000) also asymmetrically
inform one member of the bargaining pair,
who negotiate only over price. Both bargainers
2. The California Energy Commission (CEC 2004)
has weighed in on the side of the suppliers. Notably,
the CEC also recommends that suppliers be allowed to
keep their fuel prices confidential for six months, because
such information provides a basis for a competitive edge
among competing suppliers. That is, they argue that sup-
pliers should be able to keep their costs private while util-
ities should be required to reveal more quantitative details
about demand.
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know the item’s cost, but only the buyer knows
the value v she places on the item.The research-
ers do not employ a control treatment with
symmetrically informed bargainers, and they
employ alternating offer bargaining, control
beliefs over the buyer’s value v, and vary the de-
gree of uncertainty over v as a main treatment
variable. The authors employ this careful infor-
mation structure because they evaluate specific
predictions of the Grossman and Perry (1986)
sequential equilibrium model of bargaining.
Srivastava et al.’s results provide some reason-
able support for key comparative static predic-
tions, but they strongly reject the point
predictions of the model.
A hint about the importance of one-sided
information is found in the studies of one-sided
auctions (Plott and Smith 1978; Smith 1964;
Walker and Williams 1988). Although the ev-
idence from these early studies about the role
of information is tentative at best, the results
reported here suggest that a review of one-
sided processes might be in order. The early
studies do not inform traders of others’ values
or costs, but they systematically vary the trad-
ing institution so that one side of the market
is more active and may reveal endogenously
more information about their true limit prices.
In the offer auction, only sellers canmake price
offers, and buyers can only accept offers; in the
bid auction, only buyers canmake price offers,
and sellers can only accept these bids. Smith
(1964) conducted two sessions in each of these
two institution treatments, and his results sug-
gested that prices disadvantaged the side of the
market that made offers. Based on a consider-
ably larger sample of 14 experimental sessions,
however, Walker and Williams find that in
early trading periods there is not a systematic
price difference across institution treatments.
Plott and Smith cast further doubt on the the-
ory that information asymmetries play a key
role in these particular convergence processes
by demonstrating that the dynamics are ex-
actly the opposite in the one-sided posted price
markets (in which posting favors the offering
side) and oral auctions (in which tendering
hurts the offering side). Thus, role of informa-
tion in the convergence process has remained
essentially unresolved.
II. THE TRADING INSTITUTION
Our goal was to capture some salient fea-
tures of the multilateral but private, pairwise
negotiations that characterize the price dis-
covery process in the wholesale market for
electricity in California. We chose this market
structure for the experiment over classical open
outcry markets for three reasons. First, the fal-
lacy just described is typically found in regula-
tory discussions in industries in which the
industrial organization is more decentralized,
with localized, private contracts much the
same as the California wholesale electricity in-
dustry. Second, it is well known from the study
of insiders in open outcry markets that the in-
formation held by insiders quickly dissemi-
nates throughout the market, and thus the
effects of any asymmetries of information are
typically small and hard to detect (Forsythe
and Lundholm 1990; Plott and Sunder 1988).
We wanted to study the effects in a context in
which the principles at work can bemore easily
observed and studied. Third, in the California
wholesale electricity markets, contract terms
following a successful negotiation are private
information, so this market does not feature
any public transaction price information. Par-
ticipants can negotiate simultaneously with
different potential trading partners, and any
agent is free to initiate or terminate negotia-
tions with an agent on the other sideof themar-
ket at any time. Clearly, therefore, the outside
option for anynegotiation is endogenousand is
determined by trading terms available from al-
ternative trading partners.
Most previous market experiments feature
centralization of offers and/or transaction
prices, so we required a new laboratory trading
institution for these multilateral but private
negotiations. A classic telephone market, such
as the one used inHong andPlott (1982) and in
Grether and Plott (1984), could capture many
of the key features of this type of negotiation
process. The message space for telephone
negotiations is rather rich, however, and
can include intimidation, unverifiable claims,
and persuasion. Therefore, we employed a
computer-mediated negotiation process to
increase control and limit the message space
to the main variable of interest: price offers.
Figure 1 displays themain trading screen for
the Marketscape program used to capture the
key features of private, multilateral ne-
gotiations. Buyer 125, for example, receives
price offers from sellers in his X125 Personal
Market, and they are listed in ascending order
in his personal sell order book shown at the
lower right of the screen. He accepts the best
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offer by clicking on a checkbox and then
clicking the ACCEPT button. This buyer can
also send price offers to specific sellers by filling
out the order form shown on the upper right of
this screen. He can revise or add additional
offers and cancel any outstanding offers at
any time. However, he must select only one
‘‘market’’ to send any offer to, and only one
seller (i.e., that seller’s personal market) can
viewthoseparticularoffers.Therefore, individ-
ual negotiations between any pair of potential
traders are private, but traders can negotiate si-
multaneously with multiple potential trading
partners. There is no public reporting of trans-
action prices, but traders can always access
their own personal trade history.
Although this particular form of computer-
mediated negotiation is not found in the field,
where many different forms of market exist,
it is relevant for the policy question that is
the focus of our research. We are interested
in the impact of information asymmetry on
market outcomes, and this trading process care-
fully controls the information exchanged
through bargaining. The negotiation also
permits a rich exchange of price information,
without allowing more difficult-to-control
factors, such as bargaining personality and
style, to influence results. Of course, the free-
form nature of this bargaining, unlike other
structured mechanisms, such as alternating
offer bargaining, limits the applicability of
FIGURE 1
Example Marketscape Trading Screen
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most theoretical models of the bargaining
process. But it more accurately represents the
opportunities and constraints of the negotia-
tion process for energy contracts.
III. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT AND
DESIGN
In anymarket, the major underlying behav-
ioral motivations of buyers and sellers can be
captured in reduced form in demand and sup-
ply curves. Thus, to the extent that buyer in-
formation is disclosed to sellers, this is similar
to disclosing information about the buyers’
demand curve. Of course, there are various
amounts of buyer information that could be
disclosed, but each piece will reveal something
about the demand curve. There is a consider-
able range of data that the Public Utilities
Commission is considering compelling utilities
to reveal, but the scope of information disclo-
sure considered is tantamount to revealing all
the information sufficient to define a buyer’s
demand curve. Therefore, the experimental
design is based on this broad degree of infor-
mation revelation. Although the Commission
might ultimately choose a more limited degree
of information revelation, the current experi-
mental design should shed light on the direc-
tion of general effects that can be expected
if more limited amounts of information are
ultimately revealed.
As is the usual case in markets, each trader
knewhis or her own tradingmotivations—that
is, sellers knew their own production costs, and
buyers knew their own valuations for any units
they purchase. For the sessions labeled as Sell-
ers Informed, however, the sellers all received
information (available at any time through
a Payoff Summary link on their computer
screen) about the minimum amounts that each
buyer valued each unit that they might pur-
chase. Although the instructions indicated that
buyer values could exceed these minimum
revealed levels, in fact they revealed the exact
buyer values.3 The fact that sellers were in-
formed was common knowledge, but the con-
tent of this valuation information was only
distributed to the sellers. Buyers only knew
their own valuations and did not receive any
information on seller costs or other buyers’
values, as in the usual case. Asymmetric infor-
mationwas distributed analogously in sessions
labeled as Buyers Informed; in these sessions,
buyers all knew the maximum amount of each
sellers’ cost for each unit potentially supplied,
but sellers only knew their own costs.
For the analysis we divide the 17 experimen-
tal sessions into 5 designs, with 2 to 5 replica-
tions for eachdesign, as summarized inTable 1.
Design A has induced supply and demand
arrays shown in Figure 2, or a similar var-
iation with slightly different numbers of buy-
ers and sellers. The distinguishing feature of
this design is that it has a narrow range of
competitive equilibrium (CE) prices, or in
some cases a unique CE price.
Design B has supply and demand arrays
shown in Figure 3. The distinguishing feature
of this design is that it has a much wider range
of CE prices. All prices in the interval [475,
600] are equilibrium prices in which the quan-
tity supplied equals the quantity demanded.
Design C features a variety of upward de-
mand shifts in different periods, and one sup-
ply shift in an early period. The demand shifts
are displayed in the supply and demand arrays
shown in Figure 4.
Design D features a shift in both demand
and supply in period 7, which widens the CE
price interval in either the downward or up-
ward direction. Figure 5 displays the down-
ward shift employed in two sessions; the
other two sessions of this design used a mirror
image upward shift in the equilibrium interval.
Design E first shifts the supply function (in
period 6) and then shifts the demand function
(in period 10), as shown in Figure 6.
Both designs A and B have substantial
symmetries between the demand side and
the supply side. We began with symmetric de-
mand and supply conditions to control for
any influences that demand and supply shapes
might have on the convergence process and
that might obscure the separate impact of in-
formation disclosure.4 Thus, although these
curves might not reflect the conditions of3. By indicating that the buyer values could exceed the
minimum revealed, the experimenter retained the ability to
increase the buyer values without announcing that such
increases were taking place. Had the instructions claimed
that the values were exactly the redemption values, the
experimenter would have lost the ability to study the
unannounced parameter changes. Design C features un-
announced demand shifts in some periods.
4. One of the early discoveries made using laboratory
markets was that prices tend to converge from above
(below) the CE when equilibrium surplus is larger for
buyers (sellers) (Smith and Williams 1982).
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the California electricity market, they do allow
us to study how the proposed information
revelations will influence the functioning of
the fundamental laws of supply and demand.
Design C serves two functions. First, it is a
robustness check on the overall patterns of
results derived from the other designs. The
design involves a series of demand and supply
TABLE 1
Experimental Sessions
Index Location Market Parameters Disclosure Condition
040203 CIT Design A Buyer values known to sellers
040204 CIT Design A Buyer values known to sellers
040206 CIT Design A Seller cost known to buyers
040207 CIT Design A Seller cost known to buyers
040208 CIT Design D, upward shift in equilibrium in
period 7
Buyer values known to sellers
040213 Purdue Design B set 2 Buyer values known to sellers
040214 CIT Design B set 3 Buyer values known to sellers
040215a Purdue Design B Seller cost known to buyers
040215b CIT Design B Seller cost known to buyers
040215c Purdue Design B Buyer values known to sellers
040216a CIT Design C set 4b schedule 3 demand shifts
3, 4, 5, 8
Buyer values known to sellers
periods 5, 9
040216b Purdue Design C set 4b schedule 3 demand shifts
3,4,5,8
Buyer values known to sellers
periods 5, 9
040229a Purdue Design D, downward shift in equilibrium in
period 7
Buyer values known to sellers
040229b CIT Design D, downward shift in equilibrium in
period 7
Buyer values known to sellers
040301 Purdue Design D, upward shift in equilibrium in
period 7
Buyer values known to sellers
040308 Purdue Design E, supply shift per. 6, demand shift
period 10
Buyer values known to sellers
040309 Purdue Design E, supply shift per. 6, demand shift
period 10
Buyer values known to sellers
FIGURE 2
Supply and Demand for Design A
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shifts rather than the single demand or supply
shifts of the other design. It also incorporates
information revelation about demands and
supplies that are not coincident with parame-
ter changes, so information shifts that might
be contained in market activity alone is not
confounded with the information provided
through regulations to one side of the market
or the other. Second, the design is especially
relevant for exploring the issues of the
California electricity market. In this design,
the supply curves used in the experimental
markets have important qualitative features
that broadly correspond to the features found
in electricity markets. Supply is ‘‘flat’’ over a
broad range and then turns upward sharply
as capacity limits are approached. Demand,
on the other hand, is very inelastic and grows
from one period to the next. These are im-
portant similarities with the situation that
can be expected to evolve in California as
demand for electricity grows due to growing
population, short-run supply is inelastic, and
the elasticity of long-run supply is highly
uncertain due the financial stress in the gener-
ation development market. Thus the design
tests for the possibility that the particular
parameters present in the regulatory dispute
that partially motivates the study do not
have implications for the principles that are
at work.
Designs D and E, like designs A and B,
are not intended to be consistent with spe-
cific underlying properties of the California
FIGURE 3
Supply and Demand for Design B
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Supply and Demand for Design C
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electricity market. Instead, we chose these
parameters to investigate further how the
information advantage enjoyed by one side
of the market affects adjustment to new equi-
librium conditions. The designs also provide
insight into how information is disseminated
through bargaining in this multilateral negoti-
ation institution.
The other variable that we systematically
changed from one experimental session to an-
other was whether the supply side or the de-
mand side of the market was asymmetrically
blessed with knowledge about the other side.
In 13 of the 17 sessions, the sellers were given
detailed information about theminimumvalue
that units were worth to buyers. For short-
hand we refer to these as Sellers Informed ses-
sions. In the two design C sessions, the sellers
received this information inperiod 5, and itwas
not updated until period 9. In the other ses-
sions, the sellers received this information be-
fore the first period, and they were continually
FIGURE 5
Supply and Demand for Design D
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FIGURE 6
Supply and Demand for Design E
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kept up to date about changing information
about the buyers.
Although it is not the current issue in
California, for an understanding of the sym-
metry in the other four sessions the buyers
were given detailed information about the
maximum cost that sellers incurred to produce
units. We refer to these as Buyers Informed
sessions, which can be used as controls to
identify the effect of information disclosures.
As highlighted in Table 1, about one-half of
the sessions were conducted at Caltech and
one half at Purdue University. We employ site
dummy variables in some of the analyses
reported below, but we did not identify any
statistically significant differences in outcomes
across sites. All sessions used the identical
Marketscape trading program, running on a
server located in the Caltech lab. All subjects
underwent substantial Marketscape training
prior to participating in these sessions, which
included practice negotiation and trading with
robot trading partners. This training lasted
more than an hour, and it occurred either
immediately before the session or some days
or weeks prior. The specific instructions for
the sessions reported here, available online
at www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/cason/
papers/fallacy_inst.pdf,weredistributedtosub-
jects and read orally by the experimenter while
displayedonanoverheadprojector. Period 1of
each session (not reported) was a practice pe-
riod thatdidnot count in the subjects’ final cash
earnings. The exchange rate of experimental
currency todollars varied across designparam-
eters, calibrated to provide average earnings
than ranged from about $25 to $40 for the ses-
sions that lasted between 2 and 2.5 hours.
IV. RESULTS
Our first result confirms that the general
market convergence properties observed in
previous auction-type and exchange-type ex-
perimental markets also operates in these
bilateral-negotiation markets.5
Result 1
Prices in the bilateral negotiation markets
converge to a competitive equilibrium under
stable supply-demand conditions: (1) average
prices approach the competitive equilib-
rium level, (2) the variance of prices across con-
tracts declines over time, and (3) trading
efficiency approaches 100%.
Support. Despite the decentralized nature of
trading and price information, prices move
toward and usually reach the CE price range
in the sessions reported here. Early prices are
volatile and many are significantly lower than
the equilibrium price range, but eventually
most prices are within the equilibrium range.
Table 2 summarizes the deviations of the me-
dian prices from the CE for all sessions that
beganwith at least five periods of stable supply
and demand conditions (that is, all designs
TABLE 2
Deviations of Median Transaction Prices
from Competitive Equilibrium
Session
Index
Period 2
Median-CE
(1)
Period 5
Median-CE
(2)
Difference
in Absolute
Deviations
(Period 2 –
Period 5)
(3)
Period 5
Efficiency
(4)
Design A
040203 50 0 50 97.1%
040204 49 50 1 98.0%
040206 0 0 0 98.7%
040207 25 15 10 96.3%
Design B
040213 0 0 0 100%
040214 0 0 0 98.7%
040215c 0 0 0 98.3%
040215a 0 0 0 84.8%
040215b 0 0 0 98.4%
Design D
040208 25 0 25 99.2%
040301 0 0 0 99.4%
040229a 25 0 25 98.8%
040229b 0 0 0 99.7%
Design E
040308 0 0 0 86.4%*
040309 25 22.5 2.5 95.7%
*Low efficiency in period 5 of this sessionwas due to an
error made by a buyer who failed to redeem a purchased
unit before time expired. Efficiencywould have been 97.2%
if this buyer had redeemed this single unit.
5. All of the results exclude the small number of trans-
actions that were clearly typographical errors because they
differed from other transaction prices by at least one order
of magnitude; for example, a price of 57 when all recent
transaction prices ranged between 575 and 600. This ex-
cludes 48 of the 3351 transactions in the 17 sessions
(1.4%). Although these excluded transactions could influ-
ence subsequent transactions in the same session, our lack
ofpublicprice information(duetotheprivatebilateraltrad-
ing institution employed) considerably limits their impact.
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except design C). Column 1 displays the devi-
ations of the median transaction price in the
first paying period (period 2), and column 2
displays the deviations in period 5. All median
prices lie within the wide equilibrium price in-
terval in design B, but period 2 median prices
frequently deviate from the equilibrium in the
other designs. The median absolute deviations
decline significantly from period 2 to period 5,
based on the 15 statistically independent pair-
wise differences shown in column 3 (nonpara-
metric Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value ¼
0.031, one-tailed).
Price movements toward the CE interval
are clearly evident in Table 2. However, by
convergence in these types of markets, we
mean more than simply a tendency for average
or median prices to approach the equilibrium
level. In addition to average prices that ap-
proach equilibrium, convergence also requires
price dispersion to decline toward zero. That
is, we expect the ‘‘law of one price’’ to prevail
in markets that have converged. Figure 7
presents evidence on this dimension of conver-
gence. The figure displays the standard errors
of the mean associated with the average trans-
action prices up until the first shift in supply
and demand, averaged across all sessions
within each treatment (except design C). In
most sessions the price dispersion, as shown
on the vertical axis, is high during the early
periods. As the periods progress the dispersion
falls dramatically in the sense that early disper-
sion is on the order of two to five times that
of later periods. In other words, competitive
pressures are bringing the prices together,
even though price information is never publicly
displayed and traders can only infer prices
through their bilateral negotiations with other
traders. Another convergence criteria often
used when analyzing laboratory markets is
increasing trading efficiency. Trading effi-
ciency is defined as the percentage of maxi-
mum (CE) trading surplus realized in the
market. As shown in column 4 of Table 2,
our markets were highly efficient, with period
5 efficiencies typically in the 95–100% range.
The next result presents the most impor-
tant conclusion from the experiment: the rela-
tionship between pricing outcomes and the
asymmetric distribution of information.
Result 2
Information confers a pricing advantage,
particularly during the equilibration phase of
market interactions when prices are adjusting
toward equilibrium.
Support. Consider Figures 8 and 9, which
show the median transaction prices for each
period and each session in designs A and B.
The Buyers Informed sessions are identified
with the triangle and the cross in both figures.
FIGURE 7
Price Dispersion, by Treatment, Prior to First Supply or Demand Shift
(Average Standard Error of the Mean Transaction Price)
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In design A (Figure 8), for all periods except
one the maximum median price in any Buyers
Informed session is lower than the minimum
median price in any Sellers Informed session.
Pooling the data in design A across sessions
and periods, we find that prices are on average
7% higher when sellers are informed (484)
than when buyers are informed (453). Like-
wise, in design B (Figure 9), median transac-
tion prices are also usually higher in the
Sellers Informed sessions than in the Buyers
Informed sessions. Pooling across sessions
and periods in design B, prices are on average
8% higher when sellers are informed (555)
than when buyers are informed (516).
Prior to the midsession shift, design D has
the same supply and demand configuration as
design A. This design therefore provides four
additional sessions (all with sellers informed)
to add to the nine design A and B sessions
shown in Figures 8 and 9 for a statistical com-
parison of prices in the two information treat-
ments. For this comparison we use the period
5 (median price – competitive equilibrium
price midpoint) deviations for each session
in designs A, B, and D to provide comparable
FIGURE 8
Median Transaction Prices by Session, Design A
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FIGURE 9
Median Transaction Prices by Session, Design B
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preshift prices in all sessions. These deviations
are positive in only one of the four Buyers
Informed sessions, but are positive in five of
the nine Sellers Informed sessions. A nonpara-
metric Mann-Whitney test, based on the 13
statistically independent session observations,
marginally rejects the hypothesis that these
period 5 deviations are not different in the
two treatments in favor of the one-sided alter-
native that prices are higher when sellers have
some information about buyer values (p-value¼
0.087, NA ¼ 9, NB ¼ 4). We draw a similar
conclusion from a simple cross-sectional ordi-
nary least squares regression that employs
one period 5 price deviation observation per
session, which allows us to control for design
differences with a design B dummy variable
and experimental site differences with an
(insignificant) Purdue dummy variable. The
point estimate indicates a 24 franc higher me-
dian price when sellers are informed (SE 13.3,
one-tailed p-value ¼ 0.053).6
Result 3
The pricing advantage provided by the
asymmetric disclosure of information often
declines as prices approach the equilibrium,
but the pricing advantage can persist when
a wide range of equilibrium prices exists.
Support. Figures 8 and 9 indicate that the
price differences between Buyers Informed
and Sellers Informed sessions are generally
more pronounced in the early periods than
in the later periods. For example, consider
the size of the percentage price difference
across these two opposite cases for the first
three paying periods (periods 2 through 4)
compared to the next three paying periods
(periods 5 through 7). In design A (i.e., narrow
range of equilibrium prices), the differences in
prices across treatments are modestly greater
in periods 2–4 (averaging 8.1%) compared to
periods 5–7 (averaging 6.7%). But in design B
(i.e., wider range of equilibrium prices), in
periods 2–4 the prices are on average 10.1%
higher when sellers are informed (544) than
when buyers are informed (494), whereas in
periods 5–7 the prices on average are only
5.3% higher when sellers are informed (558)
than when buyers are informed (530).
Nevertheless, an independent examination
of the longer design B sessions 040215a and
040215c indicate that the pricing advantage
can persist even after prices have converged
to equilibrium, as long as that equilibrium
contains a relatively wide range of prices. In
the late periods 8–10, the average transaction
price in the Sellers Informed session 040215c is
9% higher (581) than in the Buyers Informed
session 040215a (532). Note that both of these
averages are, however, still within the range of
equilibrium prices [475, 600].
Result 4
The response of realized transaction prices
to changes in equilibrium market conditions
depends on the information available to trad-
ers about the new supply and demand situa-
tion. (1) Design D sessions show that when
both types of traders can recognize an underly-
ing shift, prices adjust toward the midpoint of
the new equilibrium price range; (2) design E
sessions show thatprices donot adjust to reflect
cost reductions when only sellers are aware of
the underlying change in market conditions.
Support. Figures 10 and 11 present median
transaction prices for the 6 sessions in Designs
DandE.Sellerswere informedof theminimum
buyer values in all six of these sessions. In de-
signDanarrowmarket equilibriumprice range
in early periods is followed by a large demand
and supply shift in period 7 to a condition that
results in both inelastic demand and inelastic
supply and a wide range of equilibrium prices.
After the shift, however, prices that were very
near the old equilibrium price remain as possi-
ble new equilibrium prices. Thus, because we
observe prices in the equilibrium range—as
documented throughout these results—a pos-
sibility exists that prices would move very little
or by a substantial amount (up to 50%) after
the shift is introduced in period 7.
Despite the possibility that prices need not
adjust by much to reach a new equilibrium
level, however, prices in fact adjust quickly
6. We obtain similar results if we replace the median
price dependent variable with a variable representing seller
profits. In particular, define Relative Seller Profit as the
aggregate seller earnings divided by the earnings that sell-
ers would receive if all efficient trades occurred and took
place at the CE price midpoint. This normalization adjusts
seller profits for the differing supply and demand condi-
tions across sessions. A regression of period 5 Relative
Seller Profit on the disclosure rule, design and site dummy
variables indicates a point estimate of 13% higher Relative
Seller Profit when sellers rather than buyers are informed
(SE 8.6, one-tailed p-value ¼ 0.079).
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and significantly to near the middle of the new
equilibrium price range. What is perhaps more
surprising is that the shift is similar in speed
and size when the equilibrium shifts down
compared to when it shifts up, even though
in all four sessions sellers have some informa-
tion about the buyers’ values and buyers never
know the sellers’ costs. Buyers can infer that
market conditions are changing in period 7,
though, because of their own dramatically re-
vised resale values. This may have motivated
them to negotiate aggressively with sellers fol-
lowing the shift, leading to substantial down-
ward price pressure when the equilibrium price
range shifted all the way down to 280 francs.
This conjecturemotivated themore subtle sup-
ply and demand shifts introduced in design E.
In design E, sellers’ costs shifted down in
period 6, resulting in a downward widening
of the competitive equilibrium price interval.
Buyers’ values remained unchanged, and they
received no information about sellers’ costs, so
they should have been unaware of the supply
shift. Although prices could have fallen by as
much as 20% following this shift and still re-
main in the equilibrium range, Figure 11 shows
that median prices hardly adjust (remaining
mostly around 700 francs) in both sessions.
By contrast, median prices increase immedi-
ately in both sessions when a demand shift
that is known to the informed sellers is intro-
duced in period 10, and prices continue to rise
thereafter. This suggests that when sellers are
asymmetrically informed about buyer values,
FIGURE 11
Median Transaction Prices by Session, Design E
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FIGURE 10
Median Transaction Prices by Session, Design D
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the transaction prices are more sensitive to
demand shifts than they are to supply shifts.
Result 5
All results stated previously survive the
robustness tests of series C.
Support. Series C consists of two sessions op-
erating under the same parameters. The time
series of median transaction prices are dis-
played in Figure 12. In these sessions the first
two periods have stationary, symmetric de-
mand and supply with consumer surplus equal
to producer surplus. Prices converge to near
the competitive equilibrium by period 2, con-
sistent withResult 1. In period 3 a demand and
supply shift takes place that is not announced
to any traders. As can be seen prices move up,
possibly reflecting the asymmetric rents, with
consumer surplus greater than producer sur-
plus and the market in the early part of adjust-
ment feeling the changes with a consequent
shift upward in price. In period 4 another
upward demand shift takes place that exacer-
bates this rent asymmetry but does not affect
the equilibrium price range. The information
of the shift is not given to the sellers, and there
is no tendency for prices to move upward,
consistent with Result 2 that the information
disclosure is a key feature that conveys advan-
tages to the information receiving side. In pe-
riod 5 another upward shift in demand takes
place, this time widening the equilibrium price
range. At the beginning of the period, some
information about the demand is disclosed
to the sellers, and consistent with Result 2
the prices immediately jump in one market
and move sharply upward in the other market
two periods later. In period 8 another upward
demand shift takes place without information
disclosure. This shift in demand has no effect
on market prices in session 040216a and a
small effect in session 040216b, but because
the 040216b market had an upward drift in
prices anyway, attribution to the demand shift
is problematic. In period 9 when some infor-
mation about demand is disclosed and sellers
learn of the shift, the market prices imme-
diately respond upward in session 040216a,
and median prices respond upward with a
one-period lag in session 040216b. The phe-
nomena identified in all of the previous results
are also found in this more complex setting
thereby demonstrating that the results are ro-
bust to such environmental changes.
V. CONCLUSION
This research was motivated by a prop-
osition about a basic principle that governs
market behavior that is widely asserted in
regulatory settings. The proposition is that
disclosure of plans and market strategies by
one side of a market to the other side will
be helpful to market performance and ben-
eficial to all of the market participants. The
proposition reflects a belief about how the laws
of supply and demand work and the manner in
FIGURE 12
Median Transaction Prices by Session, Design C
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which information works to facilitate their
operation. The results of the experiments dem-
onstrate that such a proposition is not correct.
In the context of market transactions, such
disclosures damage the disclosing party. The
laws of supply and demand follow a com-
pletely different set of principles from those
on which the proposition rests.
In the case of the California wholesale
electricity market, the proposition holds that
electricity prices will be lower to the consum-
ing public if the major electricity demanders
would make their demand function known
to suppliers prior to contracting. The ex-
periments demonstrate that the presumption
should be that opposite would be the case.
Disclosure of the demand information would
result in a tendency for prices to increase, es-
pecially in the cases in which demand and
supply are both inelastic and in which demand
is changing, as is expected to be the case in
California in the future.
Is it the case that the California wholesale
electricity market is special in the sense that
the law of supply and demand would work
completely differently than the way that it is
observed at work in the laboratory? Currently
neither general theory nor institutional fact
has been advanced to suggest anything other
than a presumption that the basic principles
operate in California in the same way that they
are assumed to work in general. Indeed, advo-
cates of the forcing of information revelation
have produced no theory at all and instead
have advanced the proposition as if it is com-
pletely general, applicable to all markets.
Thus, the experiments produced here place
a burden on the advocates to produce a theory
of sufficient generality to support the prop-
osition that they advance. When that is done,
additional tests can be performed to test its
reliability.
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